In Liberia,State-Owned Enterprises or SOEs are important economic entities.They are relied on,and expected to,produce essential goods and provide services for households and businesses,create public sector jobs,contribute to gross domestic product(GDP)and pay dividends to the government.The firms are also expected to support socioeconomic development of the country.However,these companies continue to struggle with the problem of poor management and unproductivity despite being allotted millions of dollars in subsidy in the annual budget.Therefore,the purpose of this study is to examine the role of the board of directors in the management and operation of state-owned enterprises.Precisely,the study investigates the nature and type of decisions the board makes in the running of the SOEs;and mechanisms or codes available to define and guide the board role.Quantitative method was used for the investigation,while structured or closed-ended,survey questionnaire was administered to gather data from45board members and senior managers from five of the15state-owned enterprises,and41valid responses were received.The study used"R"(a software)to analyze the data.　　The findings show that the board of directors is not fully involved in the management of the companies.The board lacks authority and independence;it is therefore limited to making only certain minimum decisions in the management and operation of the firms.The chief executive officers(CEOs)and other senior executives appointed by the government have powerful political connections and tend to dominate the board.The loyalty of the chief executive officer(CEO)and his/her deputies is to the government—the appointing power.There is no existence of a national code of corporate governance that defines the role and responsibilities of the board.One of the decision-making powers of SOEsboards is to scrutinize and approve the annual budget of the enterprise.In contrast,the findings of the present study revealed that the board of directors does not possess the authority to approve the companys annual budget;neither does it partake in the nomination and appointment process of the COE and other senior executives.This phenomenon is strange and sharply contradicts good corporate governance practices.In addition,the monitoring role of the board is weak because most board members are not informed about the business of the company.