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本文以2007~2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,将商誉减值作为并购绩效的考查指标,检验商誉减值与高管薪酬之间的关系。研究发现,唯有民营上市公司的商誉减值与高管薪酬显著负相关。进一步的研究发现,管理层权力显著降低了商誉减值与高管薪酬之间的负相关关系。由此得出结论,民营上市公司董事会在制定高管薪酬时会将商誉减值纳入业绩评价指标体系,据以调整高管薪酬,而管理层权力会对其产生抑制作用,即具有负向公司治理作用。
Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, this paper uses the impairment of goodwill as the index of M & A performance to test the relationship between impairment of goodwill and executive compensation. The study found that only the impairment of goodwill of private listed companies was significantly and negatively related to executive compensation. Further research found that management power significantly reduced the negative correlation between impairment of goodwill and executive compensation. It concludes that the board of directors of private listed companies in the development of executive compensation will be the goodwill impairment into the performance evaluation index system, according to the adjustment of executive compensation, and management power will have a inhibitory effect on it, that is, have a negative Corporate governance role.