基于委托代理模型的岗位竞聘问题的研究

来源 :数学的实践与认识 | 被引量 : 0次 | 上传用户:CRONALDO_7
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将委托代理模型引入岗位竞聘问题中,并在两阶段委托代理模型中引入审核机制,首先建立了岗位竞聘问题的单阶段委托代理模型,然后通过建立两阶段的委托代理模型来促使代理人讲真话,最后引入事前审核机制进一步优化岗位竞聘问题.分析表明契约本身具有鉴别代理人类型的功能,但要在契约签订之后才显现出来,在契约签订之前进行审核可以以一定的概率显示代理人真实类型,但需要支付一定的成本,委托人需要进行利益权衡选择审核与否. Introducing the principal-agent model into the post competition, and introducing the audit mechanism in the two-stage principal-agent model, firstly, the single-phase principal-agent model of the post competition is established, and then the principal is prompted to establish the two-stage principal-agent model Then the pre-approval mechanism is introduced to further optimize the position competition.Analysis shows that the contract itself has the function of identifying the type of agent, but it does not appear until the contract is signed. Before the contract is signed, it can show the true agent with a certain probability Type, but need to pay a certain cost, the client needs to weigh the interests of the choice of audit or not.
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