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针对兼课教师在高校发展过程中的工作性质的特殊性及由此带来的道德风险,借助于Holmstrom和Milgrom的多任务委托代理模型的分析框架,选取降低运营成本、提高教学质量和提升高校核心竞争力三项任务,建立多任务委托代理模型,研究高校与兼课教师之间的激励机制,从而揭示出由于信息不对称而带来的委托代理问题的治理机制。研究结果表明:对三项任务的最优激励与风险规避度呈负相关;当任务之间完全替代时,代理人会使自己在不同任务上努力的边际收益相等,避免激励扭曲;当任务之间相互独立时,激励水平与任务间的相互独立性无关;同时应加强对隐性支出的肯定与激励。
Aiming at the peculiarities of the nature of work and the moral hazard brought about by the part-time teachers in the development of colleges and universities, with the help of Holmstrom and Milgrom’s multi-tasking agency model, this paper chooses to reduce the operating costs, improve teaching quality and improve the core of colleges and universities Competitiveness of the three tasks, the establishment of multi-task proxy model to study the incentive mechanism between the university and part-time teachers to reveal the management mechanism of the principal-agent problem brought by the information asymmetry. The results show that: the optimal incentive for the three tasks is negatively correlated with the risk aversion; when the tasks are completely replaced, the agents will make their marginal benefits of efforts on different tasks equal, avoiding the incentive distortions; when the tasks In the case of mutual independence, the level of motivation has nothing to do with the independence of the tasks; at the same time, the recognition and encouragement of hidden expenses should be strengthened.