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承袭La Porta等(1999)的终极控制权论,实证考察了终极控制股东的超额控制以及终极产权性质对信息透明度的影响。研究结果表明:终极控制权和现金流量权的分离增加了终极控制股东攫取控制权私利的动机和能力,并进而影响了上市公司的信息披露策略和透明度;上市公司信息透明度与终极控制股东控制权和现金流量权的分离程度显著负相关;与国有控股上市公司相比,民营上市公司终极控制权和现金流量权的分离程度更加严重,其主动提高透明度的动机更小,信息透明度更低。
Following the theory of ultimate control of power by La Porta et al. (1999), this paper empirically examines the influence of ultimate controlling shareholder over-control and the nature of ultimate property on information transparency. The results show that the separation of the ultimate control rights and the cash flow rights increases the motivation and ability of the ultimate controlling shareholder to seize the private benefits of control, thus affecting the information disclosure strategy and transparency of the listed company; the transparency of information of the listed company and the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control And the degree of separation of cash flow right is significantly and negatively correlated. Compared with the state-controlled listed companies, the degree of separation of the ultimate controlling power and the cash flow right of private listed companies is more serious, and their motivation to improve transparency is smaller and the information transparency is lower.