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为解决多级供应链不同主体间应对碳限制与碳税机制问题,基于Stackelberg博弈理论研究了由单制造商、多分销商和多零售商构成的多级供应链生产-库存系统碳税博弈策略.针对政府对于企业超标准排放的容忍程度,设定了级差等级碳税,并据此建立了多级供应链生产-库存系统策略集合;对比级差碳税与统一碳税下四种博弈策略的成本及碳排放水平变化,给出了制造商和零售商主导下的非合作博弈模型以及供应链成员间合作博弈模型,并进行了分析.数值算例验证了模型和算法的有效性.
In order to solve the problem of carbon limitation and carbon tax mechanism in different subjects of multi-level supply chain, a game theory of carbon tax based on Stackelberg game is proposed to study the carbon tax of multi-level supply chain, which consists of single manufacturer, multi-distributor and multi-retailer In view of the tolerance of the government to the excessive discharge of the enterprise, a carbon tax on the level of difference is set up, and a multi-level supply chain production-inventory system strategy set is set up accordingly. Contrasting the four kinds of game strategies under the differential carbon tax and the unified carbon tax Cost and carbon emission, the noncooperative game model dominated by manufacturers and retailers and the cooperation game model among supply chain members are given and analyzed. Numerical examples show the effectiveness of the model and the algorithm.