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恶意再融资是近年中国资本市场发展过程中的焦点议题,现有相关研究主要囿于监管者视角,鲜见基于投资者视角所做的研究。本文针对上市公司恶意再融资表现形式及其相对重要性,对中部四省投资者做了较大规模的问卷调查。以此为基础,本文归纳出了上市公司再融资恶意的12种主要表现形式,发现“上市公司在再融资计划推出前1年给高管发放巨额薪酬”等6种行为是典型恶意行为。进一步地,本文研究认为,上市公司恶意再融资是在多层委托代理关系导致企业内外治理机制不完善的背景下,相关利益主体寻租活动的“理性”选择;现有的再融资审核监管程序对抑制上市公司恶意再融资行为作用有限;虽然恶意再融资行为对公司业绩具有负面影响,但在再融资监管不到位的情况下,受短期利益诱惑,上市公司仍热衷于恶意再融资。
Malicious refinancing is a hot topic in the development of China’s capital market in recent years. The existing relevant research mainly focuses on the perspective of regulators and seldom studies based on investor’s perspective. In view of the manifestations and the relative importance of malicious refinancing of listed companies, this paper makes a large-scale questionnaire survey among investors from four provinces in central China. Based on this, the paper summarizes 12 main manifestations of malicious refinancing of listed companies and finds that six kinds of behaviors, such as “large-sum remuneration paid to senior management one year before the refinancing plan is introduced”, are typical malicious behaviors . Furthermore, this study argues that malicious refinancing of listed companies is “rational ” choice of relevant stakeholders’ rent-seeking activities in the context of the imperfect governance mechanism of internal and external enterprises caused by multi-layer agency relationship; the existing refinancing audit Regulatory procedures have a limited effect on the suppression of malicious refinancing of listed companies. Although malicious refinancing has a negative impact on the performance of a company, under the circumstance of inadequate refinancing supervision, tempted by short-term interests, listed companies are still keen on malicious refinancing.