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按照康德的先验哲学,物自身不是认识的对象,通过感性直观被给予我们的不过是杂多表象,由杂多表象而形成知识乃至形成经验所需的“综合”只能是知性的自发性功能。然而,当康德不只一次说通过感性直观一个对象被给予我们,通过知性范畴该对象被思维的时候,感性直观给予我们的对象是什么对象?感性直观所给予的对象与知性范畴所认识的对象如何可能是同一个对象?这就是我所说的“对象之谜”。本文试图从现象学的角度解开这个谜,围绕关于《纯粹理性批判》之范畴演绎的分析,说明知性范畴不仅构成了知识的先天条件,同时也构成了经验对象的先天条件。
According to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the thing itself is not the object of cognition, and what is given to us through the sensual intuition is only the omnipotent appearance, and the “synthesis” necessary for the formation of knowledge and even the formation of experience from the metaphorical appearance can only be intellectual Spontaneous function. However, when Kant, more than once, refers to an object given to us through perceptual intuition, what is the object given to us by sensual intuition when the object is thought through the intellectual category? What is the object given by the sensual intuition and the object recognized by the intellectual category? May be the same object? This is what I call “the mystery of the object.” This paper attempts to solve this mystery from the perspective of phenomenology. Based on the analysis of the category deduction of “Critique of Pure Reason”, this paper shows that the intellectual category not only constitutes the innate condition of knowledge, but also constitutes the innate condition of the experience object.