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根据通用博弈模型研究发电商在制定竞价策略时是否考虑竞争对手行为对市场均衡的影响。通过建立日前市场发电商的通用博弈模型,求解出市场出清结果,继而推导发电商在不考虑和考虑竞争对手行为2种情况下的最优策略,指出这2种情况下的市场均衡分别对应Cournot模型和供给函数模型的均衡结果,证明了市场出清电价、发电商的上网电量和收益等出清结果对发电商策略参数的单调性,从而确定发电商策略参数变化时各种市场出清结果的变化趋势,并据此在成本对称和领导–跟随者2种常见成本结构下对不同情况下的市场均衡进行对比。算例验证了上述结论。
According to the common game model, it studies whether the power producer considers the influence of competitor’s behavior on the market equilibrium when formulating the bidding strategy. By establishing a common game model of market power producers in recent days, the market clearing result is solved and then the optimal strategy of power suppliers without considering and considering competitor behavior is derived. It is pointed out that the market equilibrium in these two cases corresponds respectively Cournot model and the supply function model to prove the monotonicity of the strategy parameters of the producer such as the clearing price of the market, According to this, the market equilibrium in different situations is compared under the two common cost structures of cost symmetry and leader-follower. The example verifies the above conclusion.