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研究了机构投资者串谋对首次公开发行价格的影响,通过对中国IPO市场中两阶段询价制度的分析,构建了存在信息更新情况下机构投资者的报价策略模型以及发行方的最优定价策略模型。理论分析表明:机构投资者的串谋行为会影响IPO价格;配售比例、市场信息质量、参与申购人数、机构投资者的风险厌恶程度以及私人信息质量等因素亦会影响IPO价格,从而给出了机构投资者存在串谋情况下首次公开发行成败的条件。最后,通过数值算例进一步分析了上述结果。
This paper studies the influence of institutional investors conspiracy on initial public offering price. By analyzing the two-stage inquiry system in China’s IPO market, this paper constructs a bidding strategy model for institutional investors under the existence of information updating and the optimal pricing of issuers Strategy model. The theoretical analysis shows that the conspiracy of institutional investors will affect IPO prices. Factors such as the proportion of placing, the quality of market information, the number of subscriptions, the degree of risk aversion of institutional investors and the quality of private information will also affect IPO prices, Institutional investors exist under conditions of collusion in the initial public offering success or failure. Finally, the above results are further analyzed by numerical examples.