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针对区域品牌农产品频发质量事故的现状,从企业集群质量维护的外部正效应入手,构建生产企业质量维护合作机制的演化博弈模型,并进行分析求解。研究结果表明,质量维护投入的成本收益转化系教与生产企业行为决策密切相关,当成本收益转化系数变化时,会出现多种演化稳定策略;生产企业的行为决策与它们“搭便车”行为的额外收益大小相关,如果“搭便车”行为额外收益大,那么生产企业的质量维护合作积极性将显著降低;随质量维护成本的增大,在不同分担比例区间内,生产企业行为决策也会发生相反的演化趋势。
According to the status quo of frequent quality accidents of regional brand agricultural products, starting with the external positive effect of enterprise cluster quality maintenance, an evolutionary game model of manufacturing enterprise quality maintenance cooperation mechanism is constructed and analyzed. The results show that the cost-benefit transformation of quality maintenance investment is closely related to the behavioral decision-making of manufacturing enterprises. When the cost-benefit conversion coefficient changes, there will be a variety of evolutionary and stable strategies; the decision-making of manufacturing enterprises and their “free-riding” If the “free riding” behavior extra large income, then the enthusiasm of manufacturers to maintain quality cooperation will be significantly reduced; with the increase of quality maintenance costs, in different share of the proportional range of production behavior decision-making The opposite evolutionary trend will also occur.