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本文以2008~2012年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究了CFO内部董事、政府干预对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现,整体来讲,CFO进入董事会能显著提高会计稳健性;政府干预程度越小,会计稳健性越高;外部政府干预环境对CFO董事内部治理并没有产生显著影响。进一步分析发现,CFO进入董事会对于国有和非国有上市公司的会计稳健性都有显著的正向影响,政府干预只对国有企业的会计稳健性产生了显著的负向影响;在非国有企业中,政府干预程度越小,CFO越能够有效发挥治理作用。
This article takes the 2008-2012 A-share listed companies in our country as a sample to study the influence of internal directors and government intervention on accounting conservatism. The study found that, overall, the CFO’s access to the board of directors can significantly improve the soundness of accounting; the smaller the degree of government intervention, the higher the soundness of accounting; the external government intervention in the environment has no significant impact on the internal governance of CFO directors. Further analysis shows that the CFO’s accession to the board of directors has a significant positive effect on the accounting conservatism of state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies, and the government intervention has a significant negative impact on the accounting conservatism of state-owned enterprises. In non-state-owned enterprises, The smaller the degree of government intervention, CFO can play a more effective governance role.