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无论在理论上还是实践中,我国上市公司管理者和独立董事之间串谋行为都是一个不容忽视的问题。本文在国内外防范串谋理论成果的基础上,研究设计了同时防范管理者与独立董事之间的事前串谋与事后串谋的最优激励机制模型,给出了几种情形下主契约防范串谋的必要条件,并且对其应用提出了一些有益的建议,以促进我国独立董事制度的规范、有效运行。
Both in theory and in practice, the conspire between the managers and independent directors of listed companies in our country is a problem that can not be ignored. On the basis of domestic and foreign theory of conspiracy theories, this paper studies and designs the optimal incentive mechanism model that can prevent ex ante and conspiracy between managers and independent directors at the same time. Necessary conditions for collusion, and put forward some useful suggestions for its application in order to promote the standardization and effective operation of the system of independent directors in our country.