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内部资本市场的监督激励优势和双层代理问题共同决定着其资本配置功能的有效发挥,进而对其成员企业价值创造产生影响。不同所有权性质企业融资约束的差异,致使成员企业价值创造对内部资本市场资本配置功能实现程度的敏感性也不尽相同。基于上述考虑,以2004-2013年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,分析企业内部资本市场资本配置功能实现程度差异(过度投资或投资不足)与成员企业价值创造的关系。研究结果表明:投资不足或过度投资越严重,内部资本市场成员企业价值创造能力越弱,且二者呈倒U型关系;民营企业(地方国有企业)的价值创造对成员企业投资不足或过度投资较国有企业(中央国有企业)更加敏感。
The supervision and incentive superiority of the internal capital market and the double-agency problem jointly determine the effective capital allocation function, and then affect the value creation of its member enterprises. The differences of financing constraints of different ownership types result in different sensitivities of members’ value creation to the realization of capital allocation function in internal capital markets. Based on the above considerations, taking the 2004-2003 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as samples, this paper analyzes the relationship between the degree of realization of capital allocation function (overinvestment or underinvestment) and the value creation of member firms in the internal capital markets. The results show that: the underinvestment or overinvestment is more serious, the weakest value creation ability of members in the internal capital markets, and the two are inverted U-shaped relationship; the value of private enterprises (local state-owned enterprises) create under investment or overinvestment for member enterprises More sensitive than state-owned enterprises (central state-owned enterprises).