集体意向性问题是意向性理论的前沿课题,它在解释社会行动和社会事实中具有重要作用。塞尔把它引入社会哲学领域,作为其社会实在理论的前提假设。他把集体意向看作是和个体意向一样的一种基本的意向性形式,其结构是“我意向通过我的行动Y我们做X”。本文对这一观点进行新的述评。 The problem of collective intentionality is the forefront topic of intentionality theory, which plays an important role in explaining social actions and social facts. Searl introduced it into the field of social philosophy as a prerequisite for his theory of social reality. He regards collective intention as a kind of basic intentional form which is the same as the individual’s intention. The structure is “I intend to do X through my actions.” This article makes a new comment on this view.