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随着中国资本市场的不断发展和完善,公司股权的逐渐分散,使得大部分股东不能对管理层进行有效的监督;且两权分离,又使得管理者与投资者等利益相关者信息不对称;甚至可能出现管理层为突显业绩,而利用制度的缺陷来人为的对报表的盈余信息进行调控,粉饰报表,从而影响决策者做出恰当的决策。那么在现如今竞争压力如此大的环境下,企业高管是否会通过盈余管理来提升自己的业绩达到增加薪酬的目的,即薪酬激励对盈余管理影响的研究显得十分重要。
With the continuous development and improvement of China’s capital market, the gradual decentralization of the company’s equity makes most shareholders unable to supervise the management effectively. Moreover, the separation of the two rights leads to the asymmetric information of the stakeholders such as managers and investors. It may even happen that management, in order to highlight performance, uses the flaw of the system to artificially control the earnings information of the statements and gloss over the statements so as to influence the decision-makers in making appropriate decisions. So under today’s competitive pressures, whether corporate executives will improve their performance through earnings management to achieve the purpose of increasing the salary, that is, the study on the impact of salary incentive on earnings management is very important.