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现实中担保贷款的策略违约现象证实了其偿还率并不如理论预期那样高,担保贷款风险管理遇到新瓶颈.在前人研究基础上,试图将套牢理论引入中小企业奖惩机制,构造实力不同的两家非对称中小企业担保贷款模型,利用惩戒与授信的两种手段对企业实施激励,运用演化博弈模型论述风险控制机理.研究表明在一定范围内加大担保团体成员内部惩罚或授信可以有效降低策略违约的概率,降低套牢风险.
In reality, the phenomenon of the default of secured loans confirms that the repayment rate is not as high as the theoretical expectation and guarantees the new bottleneck of loan risk management.On the basis of previous studies, this paper attempts to introduce the theory of jailbreak into the incentive and punishment mechanism of SMEs, Two asymmetric SMEs loan guarantee model, using the two means of punishment and credit to implement incentive to enterprises, and use evolutionary game model to discuss risk control mechanism.The research shows that increasing the internal punishment or credit of guarantee group members can be effectively reduced within a certain range The probability of policy defaults, reducing the risk of jailbreaking.