Any serious educational theory must consist of two parts： a conception of the ends of life， and a science of psychological dynamics， i.e. of the laws of mental change. Two men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education. The educational machine， throughout Western civilization， is dominated by two ethical theories： that of Christianity， and that of nationalism. These two， when taken seriously， are incompatible， as is becoming evident in Germany. For my part， I hold that， where they differ， Christianity is preferable， but where they agree， both are mistaken. The conception which I should substitute as the purpose of education is civilization， a term which， as I mean it， has a definition which is partly individual， partly social. It consists， in the individual， of both intellectual and moral qualities： intellectually， a certain minimum of general knowledge， technical skill in one’s own profession， and a habit of forming opinions on evidence； morally， of impartiality， kindliness， and a modicum of self-control. I should add a quality which is neither moral nor intellectual， but perhaps physiological： zest and joy of life. In communities， civilization demands respect for law， justice as between man and man， purposes not involving permanent injury to any section of the human race， and intelligent adaptation of means to ends.
　　If these are to be the purpose of education， it is a question for the science of psychology to consider what can be done towards realizing them， and， in particular， what degree of freedom is likely to prove most effective.
　　On the question of freedom in education there are at present three main schools of thought， deriving partly from differences as to ends and partly from differences in psychological theory. There are those who say that children should be completely free， however bad they may be； there are those who say they should be completely subject to authority， however good they may be； and there are those who say they should be free， but in spite of freedom they should be always good. This last party is larger than it has any logical right to be； children， like adults， will not all be virtuous if they are all free. The belief that liberty will ensure moral perfection is a relic of Rousseauism， and would not survive a study of animals and babies. Those who hold this belief think that education should have no positive purpose， but should merely offer an environment suitable for spontaneous development. I cannot agree with this school， which seems to me too individualistic， and unduly indifferent to the importance of knowledge. We live in communities which require cooperation， and it would be utopian to expect all the necessary cooperation to result from spontaneous impulse. The existence of a large population on a limited area is only possible owing to science and technique； education must， therefore， hand on the necessary minimum of these. The educators who allow most freedom are men whose success depends upon a degree of benevolence， self-control， and trained intelligence which can hardly be generated where every impulse is left unchecked； their merits， therefore， are not likely to be perpetuated if their methods are undiluted. Education， viewed from a social standpoint， must be something more positive than a mere opportunity for growth. It must， of course， provide this， but it must also provide a mental and moral equipment which children cannot acquire entirely for themselves.