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银行借贷是我国中小企业当前最为重要的融资渠道之一。然而由于中小企业内部管理不规范、信息不对称等特点,导致其在与银行信贷交易时处在弱势地位。信息不对称带来的逆向选择和道德风险,致使银行的贷款供给不一定为贷款利率的单调增函数,在竞争均衡下也可能出现信贷配给(StiglitandWeiss,1981)。抵押物可以消除信息不对称和信贷配给,对于资质较低的企业来说
Bank lending is one of the most important financing channels for SMEs in our country at present. However, due to the non-standard internal management of SMEs, asymmetric information and other characteristics, resulting in its credit transactions with banks in a disadvantaged position. Asymmetric information brings about adverse selection and moral hazard, which makes the supply of loans to banks not necessarily a monotonous increasing function of loan interest rates. Credit rationing may also occur under competitive equilibrium (Stiglit and Weiss, 1981). Collateral can eliminate information asymmetry and credit rationing, for less qualified enterprises