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鉴于政府采购中在线多属性拍卖的实际要求,利用最优机制设计理论,从社会福利的角度设计了以买卖双方总收益最大化为目标的多属性反向拍卖最优机制。结果显示最优支付不仅由自身生产能力决定,而且受到其它参与者类型的共同影响,而最优质量仅与其自身生产能力相关。利用不完全信息下的博弈理论,从拍卖方的评标规则和投标方的竞标策略角度研究了最优拍卖机制的实施。借助在线多属性采购平台的决策支持,拍卖通过第一阶段多属性密封式投标选定赢者,通过第二阶段多属性公开协商达成最优拍卖机制结果。相比均衡投标结果,最优拍卖机制减少了采购方少量收益并显著增加了投标方的利润,最终使得买卖双方整体福利的增加。理论推导和实例分析都证明该拍卖可以找到最优投标者并实现最优拍卖机制结果。
In view of the actual requirements of online multi-attribute auction in government procurement, the optimal mechanism of multi-attribute reverse auction is designed from the perspective of social welfare with the objective of maximizing the total return of both buyer and seller, using the optimal mechanism design theory. The results show that the optimal payment is not only determined by its own production capacity but also influenced by other types of participants, while the best quality is only related to its own production capacity. Using the game theory under incomplete information, this paper studies the implementation of the optimal auction mechanism from the auctioneer’s bid evaluation rules and the bidder’s bidding strategy. With the help of online multi-attribute procurement platform, the auction selects winners through the first stage multi-attribute sealed bidding and achieves the optimal auction mechanism result through the second stage multi-attribute open negotiation. Compared with the balanced bidding result, the optimal auction mechanism reduces the buyer’s small amount of return and significantly increases the bidder’s profit, which ultimately leads to an increase in the overall welfare of both the buyer and the seller. Both theoretical derivation and case study prove that the auction can find the best bidder and achieve the optimal auction result.