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在一个自然实验的框架下,本文考察了我国2007年《物权法》实施后,债权人求偿保护对上市公司债务融资决策的影响。研究发现,法制改革后,债权人强势监管和求偿威胁造成了债权人激励与终极控制人规避两方面的影响。相对于两权分离度低的终极控制人而言,两权分离度高的终极控制人的规避效应更为明显,具体表现为:(1)从债务融资规模来看,终极控制人两权分离度高的上市公司将更大幅度地缩减其债务融资规模,尤其是银行债务规模;(2)从债务期限结构来看,债权人求偿保护强化了短期债务的治理效应,终极控制人两权分离度高的公司将更大幅度地减少其短期债务,变相地增加治理效应较弱的长期债务。
Under the framework of a natural experiment, this paper examines the impact of the claimant’s claim protection on the debt financing decisions of listed companies after the implementation of the “Property Law” of 2007 in China. The study found that after the legal reform, the strong supervision of creditors and the threat of claims caused the creditors incentives to evade the ultimate controller. Compared with the ultimate controller with low separation of powers, the ultimate control person with high separation of powers has more obvious avoiding effects. The specific performance is as follows: (1) From the scale of debt financing, the ultimate controller’s separation of powers Highly listed companies will further reduce their debt financing scale, especially the size of bank debt; (2) From the perspective of the debt maturity structure, creditor claims protection strengthens the governance effect of short-term debt, the ultimate controller of the separation of powers High-grade companies will reduce their short-term debts more dramatically and disguisedly increase long-term debt with weaker governance effects.