文章通过对2000-2004年我国上市公司的实证研究表明,上市公司的大股东仍然是国有企业原来的上级主管部门或企业,对大股东负责实际上是对国有企业原来的上级行政主管部门或企业负责;又由于这种持股主体是一种虚拟主体,它对上市公司经营者的监督和约束缺乏内在动力,上市公司的经营体制出现向国有企业复归的现象。另外,由于上市公司股权的流动性不同和持股集中度不同,导致了“同股不同价”和“同股不同权”的情况,也导致了以股权融资为主要方式圈钱现象。 The article through the empirical study of listed companies in China from 2000 to 2004 shows that the major shareholders of listed companies are still the original higher authorities or enterprises of state-owned enterprises. Responsibility to the major shareholders is actually the responsibility of the former superior administrative department or enterprise of state-owned enterprises And because of the fact that the main body of the shareholding is a kind of virtual subject, it lacks inherent motivation to supervise and restrain the listed company’s managers, and the management system of the listed companies appears the phenomenon of reversion to the state-owned enterprises. In addition, due to the different liquidity of shares of listed companies and different shareholding concentration, the situation of “different shares of the same shares” and “different shares of the same shares” has also led to misappropriation of funds as the main way phenomenon.