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本文以盈余可靠性维度作为盈余质量的替代,检验管理者报酬契约中的会计监督作用是否存在、其受到公司股权特征制约或促进的程度以及对企业未来业绩的影响。研究发现:(1)从整体情况看,上市公司盈余的低可靠性对管理者报酬—会计业绩的敏感性产生显著负向影响,说明盈余质量影响了管理者报酬契约中的会计业绩度量。(2)政府机构直接控制的上市公司控股股东缺乏监督经理人的剩余索取权激励,在管理者报酬契约制定中对盈余质量的评价监督重视不足。(3)第一大股东对董事会的控制增强了盈余可靠性影响管理者报酬—会计业绩敏感性的程度,在一定程度上说明大股东与上市公司之间在监督激励管理者方面的“治理协同效应”。(4)第一大股东与第二大股东之比对盈余可靠性影响报酬—会计业绩的敏感性程度产生削弱的影响。(5)盈余的低质量使管理者现金报酬的激励效果受到制约,在管理者报酬契约中针对会计信息的可靠性进行会计监督,增强了对管理者进行激励的效果。
This paper uses the dimension of earnings reliability as an alternative to earnings quality to test the existence of accounting supervision in the remuneration contract of managers, the extent to which it is constrained or promoted by the characteristics of the company’s equity and the impact on the future performance of the enterprise. The findings are as follows: (1) From the overall situation, the low reliability of the listed company’s earnings has a significant negative impact on the remuneration of the managers and the sensitivity of the accounting performance, indicating that the earnings quality has affected the accounting performance measurement in the remuneration contract of the managers. (2) The controlling shareholder of the listed company under the direct control of government agencies lacks the incentive to supervise the manager’s residual claims, and lays little emphasis on the evaluation of the earnings quality in the management of the compensation contract. (3) The control of the board of directors by the largest shareholder enhances the degree of earnings reliability affecting the remuneration of managers - the sensitivity of accounting performance, to a certain extent, the “governance synergies between supervisors and supervisors in supervising and supervising managers” effect". (4) The influence of the ratio of the largest shareholder to the second largest shareholder on earnings reliability impact remuneration - the sensitivity of accounting performance is weakened. (5) The low quality of the surplus restricts the incentive effect of managers’ cash compensation, supervises the reliability of accounting information in the contract of manager compensation, and strengthens the incentive to managers.