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越来越多像GE这样的大型企业在利用多属性逆向拍卖选择新的供应商采购产品时,通常会设定较高的固定投标成本。针对此情况,建立了三阶段的非合作博弈模型,并利用求解子博弈纳什均衡策略的方法,推导出了供应商的最优投标价格。并得到以下两个主要结论:一是供应商的最优投标策略是按照生产产品真实的质量和交货期进行投标,且投标价格为最优投标价格;二是采购商的最优策略是选择投标价格最高的供应商作为拍卖获胜者,这一违反直觉的结论。这是合理的,因为投标价格最高的供应商也是类型最优的供应商,也即投标质量和投标交货期组合最优的供应商。最后,利用数值实验验证了模型的有效性,并显示出设定相对较高的固定投标成本对采购商来说是有利的。
More and more large enterprises like GE often set higher fixed bidding costs when they use multi-attribute reverse auctions to select new suppliers to source their products. In view of this situation, a three-stage non-cooperative game model is established, and the optimal bidding price of the supplier is deduced by solving the sub-game Nash equilibrium strategy. And get the following two main conclusions: First, the optimal bidding strategy of the supplier is to bid according to the real quality and delivery time of the product, and the bidding price is the optimal bidding price. Second, the optimal strategy of the purchaser is to choose It is a counterintuitive conclusion that the supplier with the highest bid price should be the auction winner. This is reasonable because the supplier with the highest bid price is also the one with the best type, ie, the supplier with the best combination of bidding quality and tender lead time. Finally, numerical experiments are carried out to verify the validity of the model and show that the relatively high fixed bidding cost is beneficial to the purchaser.