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以2008—2012年中国债券发行上市公司为样本,基于公司治理、信息不对称、感知风险理论以及投资者相对规模假说,本文检验了媒体监督与债务融资成本之间的关系。本文的研究表明,在控制相关变量情况下,媒体监督能显著降低企业的债务融资成本。在通过加入额外变量、采用工具变量法与PSM配对法等方法控制内生性后,本文结论仍然成立。本文同时发现,对于国有企业,或处于法制化水平低地区的企业,媒体监督降低企业债务融资成本的作用更大。最后,本文的结论也支持了媒体监督对于企业未来具有更高估值和较低风险的结论。
Taking the listed companies issuing Chinese bonds in 2008-2012 as a sample, this paper examines the relationship between media supervision and debt financing cost based on the theories of corporate governance, information asymmetry, perceived risk theory and investors’ relative size hypothesis. The research in this paper shows that under the control of related variables, media supervision can significantly reduce the debt financing cost of enterprises. The conclusion of this paper is still validated by adding extra variables, adopting the method of instrumental variables and PSM matching and other methods to control endogeneity. At the same time, this paper finds that media supervision plays a greater role in reducing the cost of corporate debt financing for state-owned enterprises or enterprises in regions with a low level of legalization. Finally, the conclusion of this paper also supports the conclusion that media supervision has a higher valuation and lower risk for the future of the enterprise.