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研究LR-型模糊需求下两级供应链中可变比例成本分担和质量控制的契约设计问题.在召回成本无分担的分散模式下,供应链成员努力投资不足,集中式供应链努力选择互补,互补程度关于单位召回成本和总缺陷率递增.引入可变比例成本分担契约,该契约能发挥制造商与供应商的努力选择互补效应,且双方关于努力选择的博弈存在Nash均衡.当缺陷分析成本为零时,在契约Φ下供应链成员激励相容,供应链的整体利润等于集中式最优利润.确定可变分担比例解析解、缺陷率阈值.验证结果表明,契约Φ的成本无效指数和质量无效指数均低于固定比例成本分担合同,契约Φ比固定比例成本分担合同更合理、有效.
This paper studies the contract design problem of variable proportion cost sharing and quality control in two-level supply chain with LR-type fuzzy demand.Under the decentralized model of unoccupied recall cost, supply chain members try hard to invest insufficiently, the centralized supply chain tries hard to choose complementary, The degree of complementarity increases with the unit recall cost and the total defect rate.Changing a variable proportional cost-sharing contract, the contract can play the manufacturer and supplier’s efforts to choose the complementary effect, and there is a Nash equilibrium between the two sides about the game of choice.When the defect analysis cost Is zero, supply chain member incentive is compatible under contract Φ, and the overall profit of the supply chain is equal to the centralized optimal profit. The analytic solution of variable share ratio and the defect rate threshold are determined. The verification results show that the cost inefficiency index of contract Φ and The index of ineffectiveness is lower than the fixed proportional cost sharing contract, the contract Φ is more reasonable and effective than the fixed proportional cost sharing contract.