论文部分内容阅读
近年来,国有企业改革中的委托—代理关系问题引起了许多经济学者的注意。《经济研究》杂志就这一主题陆续发表了郁光华、伏健的《股份公司的代理成本和监督机制》(1994年第3期)、姜伟的《国有企业改革中委托人—代理人问题》(1994年第11期)、翟林瑜的《从代理理论看国有企业改革的方向》(1995年第2期)、张维迎的《公有制经济中的委托人—代理人关系》(1995年第4期)等论文。这些论文在理论界引起了较大的反响。为进一步深化该问题的研究,推动我国国有企业改革的进程,《经济研究》编辑部于6月17日在北京召开了学术座谈会,就以上四篇
In recent years, the issue of principal-agent relationship in the reform of state-owned enterprises has attracted the attention of many economists. In this issue, “Economic Research” magazine has published Yu Guanghua, Fu Jian’s “Agent Cost and Supervision Mechanism of the Stock Company” (No. 3 of 1994), and Jiang Wei’s “Trustee-Agent Problem in the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises”. “(No. 11 of 1994), Yu Linyu’s ”The Direction of State-owned Enterprise Reform from the Perspective of Agency Theory“ (No. 2 of 1995) and Zhang Weiying’s ”Primer-Agent Relationship in Public-Owned Economy“ (4th Issue, 1995). ) Other papers. These papers have caused a great deal of repercussions in the theoretical community. In order to further deepen the study of this issue and promote the process of the reform of state-owned enterprises in China, the editorial department of ”Economic Research" held an academic symposium in Beijing on June 17th.