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本文从权益理论出发，首先认为“会计回归企业”是会计立场的逻辑定位，在此前提下，会计的目标和服务面向只能是“为相关利益者提供受托责任履行过程和结果的信息”。至于现实经济活动中的道德风险、逆向选择、内部人控制等所造成的会计信息失真问题的存在，无法从“会计委派制”中得到根本解决，而必须从产权结构和代理关系两方面寻求解决问题的方案。文章最后，从经济学的角度额观地分析了会计委派制的利弊得失和制度绩效，并给出了会计委派制的根本出路和可行制度安排。
Starting from the theory of rights and interests, this paper first holds that “accounting return to the enterprise” is the logical position of the accounting position. Under this premise, the objective and service orientation of the accounting can only be “providing relevant stakeholders with information on the fulfillment process and result of the fiduciary duty.” As for the existence of the distortion of accounting information caused by the moral hazard, adverse selection and insider control in real economic activities, it can not be fundamentally solved from the accountant appointing system, but must be solved from the aspects of property right structure and agency relationship The solution to the problem. Finally, from the perspective of economics, this paper analyzes the pros and cons of accounting appointment system and system performance, and gives the fundamental outlet and feasible institutional arrangements for accounting appointment system.