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本文利用一个出口竞争博弈模型,对环境税与减排技术研发补贴的最优环境政策组合问题进行讨论。分析结果显示本国企业与外国企业无论是进行产量竞争还是价格竞争,本国政府的最优政策组合均为按庇古税设定环境税税率,同时不对本国企业减排技术的研发行为进行补贴。因此,我国无需担心开征环境税对出口产品竞争力的影响,而应该要求国内企业将污染物排放所造成的外部性完全内部化,执行严格的环境标准,走可持续发展的道路。
In this paper, we use an export competition game model to discuss the optimal combination of environmental tax and R & D subsidies for environmental policy. The analysis shows that domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises, regardless of whether they are competing for output or for price competition, set the optimal tax policy for their respective governments according to the Pigouvian tax rate and do not subsidize the R & D activities of domestic enterprises for their emission reduction technologies. Therefore, China need not worry about the impact of levying an environmental tax on the competitiveness of its exports. Instead, it should require domestic enterprises to fully internalize the externalities caused by pollutant emissions, implement strict environmental standards and take the path of sustainable development.