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近10年来,中国政府通过法律手段。在上市公司中推行源于美国的独立董事制度,意图约束大股东违背公司利益的行为,保护中、小股东权益。但中国独立董事制度在目标设置、实现方式和作用环境等方面与其渊源国存在根本区别。独立董事的中国化移植曲解了该制度的起源和作用机制,退化为形式主义的空壳。未能实现立法者加诸其上的庞大目标。
The past 10 years, the Chinese government through legal means. In the listed companies in the United States from the implementation of the independent director system, intended to restrain the behavior of large shareholders against the interests of the company, protect the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. However, there is a fundamental difference between China’s independent director system and its source country in the setting of objectives, the mode of realization and the role of environment. The transplanting of Chinese independent directors misinterpreted the origin and mechanism of the system and degenerated into an empty shell of formalism. Failed to meet the ambitious goal put on the legislator.