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随着现代公司治理的不断发展,委托代理问题背景下的企业所有权和经营权两权分离风险不断放大,主要出现的管理者和所有者利益冲突等因素将成为企业未来发展的主流问题,将股权激励模式应用于上市公司治理结构中,授予被激励对象股票期权,使其最终利益与股东利益结成共同体,长期约束其在公司的经营管理行为。在股权激励模式中,尤其是上市公司管理层股权激励一直是国内外学者对于股权激励模式研究的重点,多数通过对上市公司进行股权激励后的企业绩效来评价股权激励的实施效果,而主要对近年来中国沪深两市上市公司公告管理层股权激励方案中公司层面业绩行权考核指标进行研究,指出目前行权指标设计的缺点并给出改进建议。
With the continuous development of modern corporate governance, the risk of separation of corporate ownership and management rights under the background of principal-agent problem is constantly magnified. The main conflicts of interest between managers and owners will become the mainstream issues in the future development of the enterprise. The incentive model is applied to the corporate governance structure of listed companies, granted the stock option of the incentive target and made its final interest form a community with the shareholders’ interests, which restricts its long-term operation and management behavior in the company. In the equity incentive model, especially the listed company’s management equity incentive has always been the focus of domestic and foreign scholars on the study of the equity incentive model. Most of them evaluate the effect of the equity incentive through the corporate performance after the equity incentive of the listed company, In recent years, the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets announce the management performance evaluation of management-level equity incentive plan, and pointed out the shortcomings of the current design of the right indicator and give suggestions for improvement.