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本文以企业和农户的交易关系为研究对象,在GHM模型和BGM模型基础上,保留资产专用性变量,引入替代交易费用和价格变量,放开双边垄断假设,构建了两期模型,在一个更为现实的市场结构中分析了农业自我实施合约产生的条件,讨论了替代交易用和资产专用性对讨价还价能力的影响,得出了可以检验的命题,以水稻市场现实案例诠释了模型的结论。结果表明,替代交易费用越大,资产专用性程度越高,自我实施合约产生的可能性越大;“随行就市”不是合约价格的唯一选择,受到替代交易费用和资产专用性的影响,合约价格可偏离市场价格而存在,即使同质商品市场,也会产生“价格离散”现象;替代交易费用越大,资产专用性程度越高,讨价还价能力越弱。根据这些结论,本文给出了有效发展农业产业化的政策建议。
Based on the GHM model and the BGM model, this paper retains the asset-specific variables and introduces alternative transaction costs and price variances to liberalize bilateral monopoly assumptions and builds a two-phase model This paper analyzes the conditions of agricultural self-actualization contract in the realistic market structure, discusses the influence of alternative transaction and asset specificity on bargaining power, and obtains the testable propositions. The conclusion of the model is explained by the real case of rice market. The results show that the greater the cost of alternative transactions, the higher the degree of asset specificity, the greater the possibility of self-implementation contracts. “Freefalls ” is not the only choice of contract price, which is affected by the replacement transaction costs and asset specificity. Prices can deviate from the market price, even if the homogeneous market, there will be “price discrete ” phenomenon; the greater the cost of alternative transactions, the higher the degree of asset specificity, the weaker the bargaining power. Based on these conclusions, this paper gives some suggestions on how to effectively develop agricultural industrialization.