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考虑纵向联盟环境下,基于两个制造商与一个占优零售商构成的数量竞争模型,以批发价格合同作参照,研究零售商与制造商形成纵向联盟的条件及单联盟和多联盟下收益共享合同的选择,分析了产品竞争强度对联盟形成和瓦解以及供应链各方利润分配的影响。研究结论表明,批发价格契约下零售商与制造商无法达成纵向联盟,而采用收益共享契约,零售商和制造商均能达到形成单联盟和多联盟的条件。单个制造商与零售商形成的单联盟选择不受产品竞争强度的影响,而多个制造商与零售商形成的多联盟随产品竞争强度的增大而瓦解成单联盟的情况,且多联盟的瓦解只与零售商有关,与制造商无关。
Considering the quantitative competition model of two manufacturers and one dominant retailer under the condition of vertical alliance, this paper studies the conditions under which retailers and manufacturers form vertical alliances and the revenue sharing under single alliance and multi-alliance The choice of contract, the impact of product competition intensity on formation and disintegration of alliances and profit distribution among all parties in the supply chain. The conclusion of the study shows that retailers and manufacturers can not reach a vertical alliance under the wholesale price contract, and retailers and manufacturers can reach the conditions of forming a single alliance and multiple alliances through the revenue-sharing contract. The single coalition choice formed by a single manufacturer and a retailer is not affected by the intensity of product competition, while the multi-coalition formed by multiple manufacturers and retailers disintegrates into a single coalition as the intensity of product competition increases, and the multi-coalition Disintegration is only relevant to the retailer, not the manufacturer.