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美国《1934年证券交易法》未能有效禁止公司内幕人向市场专业人士选择性地披露重要的非公开信息。《公平披露条例》(SEC,2000)现在明确禁止选择性披露。本文重点研究条例的基本框架、政策含义以及所隐藏的关键难题,初步归纳了后FD条例环境下SEC的执法行动,并剖析条例与证券交易法下反欺诈条款(Rule 10b-5)之间的相关性。本文认为,条例本身及其执行效果仍需继续探究。
The United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934 failed to effectively prohibit corporate insiders from selectively disclosing important non-public information to market professionals. The Fair Disclosure Ordinance (SEC, 2000) now explicitly prohibits selective disclosure. This article focuses on the basic framework of the regulations, policy implications, and hidden key issues. It preliminarily summarizes the SEC’s enforcement actions in the context of post-FD regulations, and analyzes the relationship between regulations and the Anti-fraud Clause (Rule 10b-5) under the Securities Exchange Act. Correlation. This article believes that the regulations themselves and their implementation effects still need to be further explored.