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长期以来,国家从国际协定和国际组织单边退出的现象为大多数法律学者所忽视。大部分国际法的学术文献倾向于谴责退出法律的行为。但是,在很多情形下,退出国际法是可取的。本文运用阿尔伯特·赫希曼传统上用以衡量公司或政治组织衰败的“退出、呼吁和忠诚”框架,以说明退出国际法的理由在于,事实上从利用退出选项的可能性中获益的国家可在全球化进程中赢得更大的发言权,并可能在不断变化世界中为促进国际法和国际组织的效率和适应性提供一条快捷路径。
For a long time, the unilateral withdrawal of states from international agreements and international organizations has been ignored by most legal scholars. Most academic literature in international law tends to condemn the withdrawal of the law. However, in many cases, it is advisable to withdraw from international law. This article uses the framework of “exit, appeal and loyalty” traditionally used by Albert Hirschman to measure the decline of corporations or political organizations to illustrate the rationale for the withdrawal from international law because, in fact, the possibility of using the opt-out option The beneficiary countries can gain a greater say in the globalization process and may provide a quick and easy way to promote the efficiency and adaptability of international law and international organizations in a constantly changing world.