论文部分内容阅读
基于杠杆收购对证券市场股价波动的影响,它与股票融资监管(即保证金交易监管)必然发生交集。监管的目的与其说是遏制杠杆收购,毋宁说是调控资本市场对杠杆的暴露程度,避免产生系统性风险。从1959年到1986年,美国围绕着杠杆收购与股票融资监管之间的关系进行了近半个世纪的探索,覆盖了从并购贷款、垃圾债券到壳公司等多种杠杆融资技术。尽管杠杆收购作为公共政策话题有着浓厚的价值判断色彩,但美联储尽量把控在技术层面处理杠杆收购与股票融资监管之间的关系。业界则通过对监管的回应而调整杠杆收购的交易结构,在未实质妨碍收购目的之前提下,减小杠杆对证券市场可能带来的冲击。美国的监管实践对我国目前正在建设中的股票融资(特别是场外配资)监管以及杠杆收购监管制度都不乏启示。
Based on the impact of leveraged buyouts on stock market price volatility, it inevitably intersects with the regulation of stock financing (ie, margin trading regulation). The purpose of regulation is not so much to curb leveraged buyouts, but rather to regulate the exposure of capital markets to leverage and to avoid creating systemic risks. From 1959 to 1986, the United States explored the relationship between the leveraged buyout and the regulation of stock financing for nearly half a century, covering a variety of leveraged financing techniques ranging from M & A loans and junk bonds to shell companies. Although LBO has a strong value as a public policy topic, the Fed tries its best to handle the relationship between leveraged buyout and the regulation of stock financing technically. The industry adjusted the leveraged buyout transaction structure through its response to regulation, reducing the possible impact of leverage on the securities market without materially hindering the purpose of the acquisition. The regulatory practices in the United States have enlightenment on the regulation of stock financing (especially over-the-counter investment) and the regulatory system of leveraged buyouts currently under construction in China.