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亏损的在位国有企业退出,如果参与者没有契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本,那么企业会自由退出市场。然而,当有契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本时,我们会发现,政府所有者只要获得正准租金,他便不会退出市场。由于契约性沉淀成本和生产要素沉淀成本,一旦退出市场这些利益无法得到相应的补偿,因此政府所有者会采取各种经济政策追求准租金最大化,直到准租金减少为零或负,他才会放弃国有产权。这样我们从沉淀成本角度内生地解释在位国企退出方式的选择,恰恰是政府所有者追求自身收入最大化的结果。
Loss of state-owned enterprises withdraw from the seat, if the participants did not contractual sedimentation costs and sedimentation costs of production, then the business will be free to exit the market. However, when there are contractual settling costs and settling costs of production factors, we find that government owners will not withdraw from the market as long as they are getting positive rent. Due to the contractual settling costs and the settling costs of the factors of production, once the interests of the market have been withdrawn, these benefits can not be compensated accordingly. Therefore, the government owners will adopt various economic policies to maximize the quasi rent, and will not wait until the quasi rent minus or minus Give up state-owned property rights. In this way, we endogenously explain from the perspective of settling costs the choice of exit stateownership enterprises, which is precisely the result of government owners seeking their own income maximization.