电力工业体制改革的内容可以概括为“一个核心，三个基础”。一个核心是指引入竞争机制，三个基础是指部门结构分解、企业重组和监管机构的完善。我国现阶段企业间信用关系差、合同执法环境不佳，“体制转换成本”远高于其他国家，因而应以逐步扩大竞争的范围和深度为指导思想，过渡初期不宜广泛推行发电商与大用户的直接交易，而以“单一买主”模式为宜。我国过渡初期的电力市场可以省级为主，但华东、华中、东北等网架联系较为紧密的地区，开始就应设计跨省的电力市场。绝大多数地区都应实现发电公司与电网的彻底分离，为保电网的安全、可靠运行，主力调峰、调频电站可暂不参与市场竞争，由电力批发市场以“两部制”电价形式将容量买断。发电企业重组应有竞争主体数量的低限和市场占有率的高限，重组方式应兼顾企业的运行效率和“起跑”条件的公平。企业以股份制形式解决各方的权益关系。新的电力监管机构应具有市场准入、运行规制、成本审核、价格监控、纠纷仲裁等系统性的管理功能。 The content of the reform of the power industry system can be summarized as “one core and three bases.” One core refers to the introduction of a competition mechanism, and the three bases refer to the decomposition of the sector structure, the restructuring of enterprises, and the improvement of regulatory agencies. At present, China’s credit relationship between enterprises is poor, the environment for contract law enforcement is poor, and the “system conversion cost” is much higher than that of other countries. Therefore, the scope and depth of gradually expanding competition should be taken as the guiding ideology. In the initial stage of transition, generation companies and large users should not be widely promoted. The direct transaction, and the “single buyer” model is appropriate. In the early transition period of China, the electricity market can be dominated by the provincial level, but areas with relatively close network connections in East China, Central China, and Northeast China should be designed to begin inter-provincial power markets. In most regions, a complete separation of the power generation company and the power grid should be achieved. To ensure the safe and reliable operation of the power grid, the main peak-sharing and frequency-modulating power stations may not participate in market competition temporarily, and the power wholesale market will use the “two-part” tariff form. Capacity buyout. The reorganization of power generation enterprises should have a lower limit of the number of competing entities and a high limit of market share. The reorganization should take into account the operating efficiency of the company and the fairness of the “starting” conditions. The company solves the rights and interests of all parties in a joint-stock system. The new power regulatory agencies should have systemic management functions such as market access, operational regulation, cost auditing, price monitoring, and dispute arbitration.