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在对企业横向兼并行为的反垄断审查中,存在两个重要指标:市场份额与产业集中度。本文将企业横向兼并行为的三种反垄断判断标准(福利标准)归纳为两种福利增进情况。并且,根据这两种福利增进的情况,建立均衡福利模型,得出实现福利增进所必须满足的市场条件,从而做出更加明确的反垄断判定。结合我国新出台《反垄断法》后第一起也是唯一的一起兼并失败案(可口可乐兼并汇源失败)进行分析,并基于我国反垄断现状和模型结论,提出相关建议。
In the antitrust review of horizontal mergers, there are two important indicators: market share and industrial concentration. This article summarizes the three kinds of antitrust judgment standards (welfare standards) of horizontal mergers in enterprises as two types of welfare promotion. In addition, based on these two kinds of welfare promotion, a balanced welfare model is set up, and the market conditions that must be met in order to realize welfare promotion are established so as to make a more definite antitrust decision. Combined with the first and only merger failure case (Coca-Cola and Huiyuan failed) after the new anti-monopoly law was introduced in our country, this paper analyzes the current situation and the conclusion of the model and puts forward relevant suggestions.