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在企业与政府有限理性的前提下,本文运用演化博弈方法构建企业与政府知识产权保护和侵权演化博弈模型,分析两类企业与政府均衡情况和策略选择,结果表明当政府的惩罚力度大于政策实施成本时,有限理性的政府会选择监管策略,此时企业是否会选择保护策略依赖于保护成本和侵权赔偿的大小;当政府的惩罚力度大于企业侵权收益时可以防止市场中的侵权行为,但此时企业可能选择搭便车行为,而不采取保护策略。
Under the bounded rationality of enterprises and government, this paper constructs the game model of evolutionary game between intellectual property protection and infringement by using evolutionary game theory, analyzes the equilibrium situation and strategy choice between the two types of enterprises and the government. The results show that when the government’s punishment is greater than the policy implementation When the cost is limited, the government with limited rationality will choose the regulatory strategy. At this time, whether the enterprise will choose the protection strategy depends on the protection cost and the size of the tort compensation. When the government’s punishment is greater than the infringement of the enterprise, it can prevent the infringement in the market, When the business may choose free-riding behavior, without the protection strategy.