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以两条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的竞争供应链为对象,分别建立Stackelberg博弈、Nash博弈以及Stackelberg-Nash博弈三种决策模型,研究供应链间竞争强度以及制造商零售商议价能力变化对制造商、零售商、顾客获益的影响。在供应链竞争环境中,无论是制造商拥有较大的议价能力,还是制造商零售商拥有相等的议价能力,制造商能否从提供服务中获益取决于议价能力和服务成本系数;而相对于制造商为领导者情形,顾客在制造商零售商拥有相等议价能力时获益更多。
Taking two competing supply chains including one manufacturer and one retailer as object, three decision-making models, Stackelberg game, Nash game and Stackelberg-Nash game, respectively, are established to study the competition intensity between supply chains and the change of bargaining power of manufacturer retailers Manufacturers, retailers, customers benefit from. In a supply chain competition environment, whether the manufacturer has greater bargaining power or retailers have equal bargaining power, whether manufacturers can benefit from providing services depends on bargaining power and service cost coefficient; and relative In the case of a manufacturer as a leader, customers benefit more from the same bargaining power of manufacturer retailers.