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考虑了消费者低碳偏好、碳限额交易机制下,单个具有减排投资行为的制造商和单个零售商在产品初始碳排量信息不对称下的行为研究。对比分析了不同供应链权利主体下制造商的最优谎报系数,并进一步讨论了不同碳市场状态、政府碳配额决策下制造商谎报对供应链的影响,最后加入惩罚机制对制造商进行约束。分析发现:两种供应链权利结构下,制造商均会高报其碳信息。谎报始终利于制造商但损害零售商利益,且低碳产品环境效益降低。同时,分析发现碳核查和惩罚机制可以约束制造商的谎报行为。
Considering the low carbon preferences of consumers and the carbon limit trading mechanism, the behavior of single manufacturer with a carbon emission reduction investment and a single retailer on the asymmetric information of the product initial carbon emissions is considered. This paper also compares and analyzes the manufacturers’ optimal response index under different supply chain rights and further discusses the influence of manufacturer misrepresentation on the supply chain under different carbon market conditions and government carbon quotas. Finally, the penalty mechanism is added to restrain the manufacturers. The analysis finds that both manufacturers will report their carbon information under the two supply chain rights structure. Lies always benefit manufacturers but damage the interests of retailers, and reduce the environmental benefits of low-carbon products. At the same time, the analysis found that carbon verification and punishment mechanism can restrain manufacturers’ false information.