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林农的营林活动对森林生态保护有着重要的影响,并受林权制度的制约。基于森林的多功能性,可将林农的营林活动分为追求经济效益的经济行为和追求生态效益的环境行为。文章作者利用Holmstrom和Milgrom多项任务委托-代理模型的精神,对以家庭承包、分户经营为主要形式的新一轮林权改革进行了再解读,并指出激励不相容是引发森林潜在生态风险的根本原因。然后,作者构建了一个政府和林农之间的双重任务委托-代理模型,从微观视角解释了林权改革如何使林农的自利性营林活动偏离社会生态目标,并分析了影响林农环境行为激励效果的主要因素。最后,作者指出完善政府激励机制,应从森林生态补偿机制、生态公益林管理体制、林农风险承载能力、政府监管等方面着手。
The forestation activities of forest farmers have an important impact on forest ecological protection and are subject to the forest rights system. Based on the multi-functional nature of forests, the forestation activities of forest farmers can be divided into economic activities pursuing economic benefits and environmental behaviors pursuing ecological benefits. Using the spirit of the multi-task entrusted-agency model of Holmstrom and Milgrom, the author re-interprets a new round of forest tenure reform that takes family contract and household management as the main forms and points out that incentive incompatibility is the potential ecological trigger for forest The root cause of risk. Then, the author constructs a dual mandate-agent model between the government and the forest farmer, and explains how the reform of forest rights deviates the self-serving forest activities of the forest farms from the social and ecological goals from the microscopic point of view and analyzes the factors influencing forest farmers’ environmental behavior incentives The main effect of the effect. Finally, the author points out that perfecting the government incentive mechanism should start from such aspects as the forest ecological compensation mechanism, the management system of ecological public welfare forests, the risk carrying capacity of forest farmers, government supervision and so on.