基于委托—代理理论我们知道,在企业所有者与经营者之间存在信息不对称的情况下,此时便会产生代理成本,股东想要降低代理成本使得经营更有效率有两个选择,一个是监督,另外一个就是激励。我国企业在激励机制上,主要以短期激励为主,短期行为比较明显。而股票期权等长期激励方式具有促使经营者行为趋向股东利益最大化目标的优点。本文主要讨论主要的长期激励方式以及其存在的一些问题,对我国推行股票期权机制具有现实意义。 Based on the principal-agent theory, we know that under the circumstance of information asymmetry between the owner and the manager of an enterprise, the agency cost will be incurred at this time. For the shareholder to reduce the agency cost and make the operation more efficient, there are two options: one Is supervised, the other is incentive. In the incentive mechanism, the enterprises in our country are mainly based on short-term incentive, while the short-term behavior is more obvious. However, the long-term incentive measures such as stock options have the advantage of promoting the goal of managers to maximize the interests of shareholders. This article mainly discusses the main long-term incentive methods as well as some of its problems, which are of practical significance for the implementation of the stock option mechanism in China.