论文部分内容阅读
公共支出过程中由于信息的不对称,存在着代理人机会主义。克服公共支出过程中的代理人机会主义,实现委托人的利益最大化,可以采用不同的四种方式。归纳起来,无非就是激励和监督。由于公共支出过程的特殊性,我们认为应该以约束监督为主。本文从信息经济学的委托—代理理论人手,结合新制度经济学分析公共支出过程中代理人机会主义的具体表现,以及解决代理人机会主义的具体方法,最后针对公共支出过程的特殊性,分析了制度约束与监督代理人的原因。
Due to the asymmetric information in the process of public expenditure, there exists the opportunist of the agent. Overcoming the agent opportunism in the process of public expenditure and maximizing the interests of the principal can adopt four different ways. To sum up, nothing more than motivation and supervision. Due to the particularity of the public expenditure process, we think that we should focus on restraint supervision. This article analyzes the concrete manifestation of the agent opportunism in the process of public expenditure and the concrete method of settling the agent opportunism from the entrust-agent theory of information economics and the new institutional economics. Finally, according to the particularity of the public expenditure process, Reasons why the system restrains and supervises agents.