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基于农户行为信息是否对称的视角,对退耕还林生态补偿契约设计及效率进行研究.结果显示,当农户行为信息对称时,不管造林产量高低,基层地方政府支付的生态补偿只能达到农户的保留效用.当农户行为信息不对称时,如果造林产量高,则农户获得超过保留效用的生态补偿;如果如果造林产量低,则农户获得低于保留效用的生态补偿.并且,基层地方政府需要支付比对称信息下更多的成本才能激励农户付出正努力水平.当农户付出正努力水平时,获得高造林产量的概率越高,则基层地方政府支付的生态补偿越接近对称信息下的补偿额度;当农户付出零努力水平时,获得高造林产量的概率越高,则基层地方政府支付的生态补偿越偏离对称信息下的补偿额度.
Based on whether the information of farmers’ behavior is symmetrical or not, this paper studies the design and efficiency of the ecological compensation contract of returning farmland to forest.The results show that when the behavior information of farmers is symmetrical, the ecological compensation paid by the local government can only reach the reservation of farmers When the information of farmers’ behavior is asymmetric, if the yield of afforestation is high, the peasants receive ecological compensation more than the retained utility, and if the yield of afforestation is low, the peasants receive ecological compensation lower than the reserved utility, and the local governments at the grassroots level need to pay the ratio The more cost under the symmetric information can encourage the farmer to pay positive effort level.When the farmers pay the positive level, the higher the probability of obtaining high forestation yield, the closer the ecological compensation paid by the local government to the compensation amount under the symmetric information. When farmers pay zero effort level, the higher the probability of acquiring high-yield forests, the more the local governments will pay the ecological compensation deviate from the compensation amount under the symmetrical information.