本文运用企业的契约理论,把公司内部重大决策看作是控制权人和利害相关人在初始契约框架下需要达成的一项子合约,分析了不同监管政策下,双方在达成完全一致方面的不可能性,从而证明引进强制性类别股东表决机制,有利于促进控制权人和流通股股东之间协商机制的贯通。 This paper uses the firm's contract theory to consider the major internal decisions of the company as a subcontract that the controlling party and the interested parties need to reach under the framework of the initial contract and analyzes whether the two parties have reached a complete agreement under different regulatory policies The possibility to prove that the introduction of a mandatory class voting mechanism for shareholders is conducive to promoting the negotiation mechanism between the controlling shareholder and the tradable shareholders.