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创新的价值在于扩散,但扩散依赖于路径选择与扩散规则.提出了技术创新扩散的一对多博弈模型,并求解出了Nash均衡解.Nash均衡表明,传播者采取扩散策略的概率与学习者的学习成本和拒绝代价之差成正比;学习者采取学习策略的概率不但与传播者的封锁成本成正比,而且与网络的平均度成正比;进而,基于马尔科夫链的吸收态,进一步分析了产业网络上技术创新博弈扩散的平均步数;基于平均场理论,分析了产业网络上技术创新博弈扩散的分布及其分布密度.最后,通过长三角IC产业网络给出了实证分析.
The value of innovation lies in diffusion, but diffusion depends on the rules of path selection and diffusion, and proposes a one-to-many game model of diffusion of technological innovation and solves the Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium shows that the probability and learner Is directly proportional to the difference between the learning cost and the rejection cost. The probability of learners adopting learning strategies is not only proportional to the blockade cost of communicators, but also proportional to the average degree of network. Furthermore, based on the absorption states of Markov chains, further analysis Based on the average field theory, the distribution and distribution density of technological innovation game diffusion in industrial networks are analyzed.Finally, an empirical analysis is given based on the IC industrial network in the Yangtze River Delta.