学术界对于外部选择权和专用性投资的关系一直存有争论。产权理论(主要是GHM模型)认为当事人外部选择权增加会提高谈判力,从而提高参与人的专用性投资激励,这是产权成为最重要激励工具的基本逻辑。然而,另一些学者则认为,当参与人外部选择权是紧的时候,外部选择权增加反而会降低参与人的投资激励。这意味着,产权不一定能够提高激励。本文在梳理已有文献争论的基础上,构建理论模型重新定义了外部选择权的范围,并在非合作博弈的框架下,得到与后一部分学者一致的结论:外部选择权的增加反而会降低参与人专用性投资的激励。同时,笔者使用云南烟草合同的微观数据,实证分析了外部选择权和专用性投资之间的关系,发现两者呈负相关关系,这进一步支持了该结论。本文的发现与主流的产权理论有所不同,具有一定的理论贡献和现实意义。 There has been debate in academic circles about the relationship between external options and earmarked investments. The theory of property rights (mainly the GHM model) argues that the increased external option of the parties will increase the bargaining power and thus enhance the incentive of the participants’ exclusive investment. This is the basic logic that property rights have become the most important incentive tool. However, other scholars argue that when the participants ’external options are tight, the increase of external options will reduce the participants’ investment incentives. This means that property rights do not necessarily increase incentives. On the basis of combing the controversial literature, constructing the theoretical model redefines the scope of the external option and concludes with the latter part of the scholars under the framework of non-cooperative game that the increase of the external option will reduce the participation Incentives for Private Investment. At the same time, the author uses the micro-data of Yunnan tobacco contract to empirically analyze the relationship between the external option and the specific investment, and found that the two are negatively correlated, which further supports this conclusion. The findings of this paper are different from those of the mainstream property rights theory, which has certain theoretical contributions and practical significance.