针对模糊需求且考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI(vendor managed inventory)供应链,依据Cui等提出的不公平厌恶模型,分析了此VMI供应链在批发价格契约下的协调情况.得到的主要结论是:在不利不公平分配情形下,公平偏好供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其为公平偏好系数(零售商势力外生参数)的严格减函数(减函数)且不高于风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,批发价格契约无法使模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI供应链达到协调;在有利不公平分配情形下,公平偏好供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其为公平偏好系数(零售商势力外生参数)的严格增函数(增函数)且不低于风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,批发价格契约在一定条件下可使模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI供应链达到协调.最后,通过数值实验分析验证了相关研究结论. According to the unfair aversion model proposed by Cui et al, this paper analyzes the coordination of the VMI supply chain under the wholesale price contract. The main conclusions obtained are as follows: for the second-level VMI (supplier managed inventory) supply chain with fuzzy demand and supplier fairness preference, Is: In the unfair unfair distribution case, the fair preference supplier has the only optimal production quantity, which is the strictly decreasing function (less the function) of the fairness preference coefficient (retailer exogenous parameter) and not higher than the risk The optimal product yield and the wholesale price contract of the sexual supplier can not make the coordination of the two-level VMI supply chain which takes into account the fairness preference of the supplier under the fuzzy demand. In the case of unfair distribution, the only preference of the fair preference supplier exists Product yield, which is a strictly increasing function (an increasing function) of the fairness preference coefficient (extrinsic parameter of the retailer force) and not less than the optimal product yield of the risk-neutral supplier, under certain conditions So that the second-level VMI supply chain under the fuzzy demand considering the fair preference of the suppliers can be coordinated.Finally, the relevant research conclusions are verified by numerical experiments.